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INTRODUCTION

A. The Story of Li Xiao-Jiang
In Atlanta, Georgia, neuroscientist Li Xiao-Jiang was at the peak of his professional career when his employment with Emory University was unexpectedly
terminated in the summer of 2019.1 Before Xiao-Jiang’s employment was terminated, he worked with his wife and lab co-leader at Emory University for twentythree years, conducting research related to Huntington disease.2 Xiao-Jiang, a
tenured professor known nationally for his research and leadership within his lab,
worked alongside committed postdoctoral students engaged in creating pig and
mouse models to study Huntington disease.3 In May 2019, however, XiaoJiang’s career came to a sudden halt when the school notified him of his termination of employment.4 According to Xiao-Jiang’s fellow researchers, university
officials seized Xiao-Jiang’s lab and confiscated computer files and documents
while Xiao-Jiang was on leave in China.5 Xiao-Jiang was stunned. In a statement
following his termination, Xiao-Jiang exclaimed, he “was shocked that Emory
University would terminate a tenured professor in such an unusual and abrupt
fashion and close [their] combined lab consisting of a number of graduates and
postdoctoral trainees without giving [him] specific details for the reasons behind
[his] termination.”6 Emory claims it followed the direction given by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) in a statement aimed at combating the “unacceptable
breaches of trust and confidentiality that undermine the integrity of U.S. biomedical research.”7
Emory University justified its actions by claiming it found evidence that XiaoJiang failed to make necessary disclosures related to his ties to China.8 Emory’s
Jon Cohen, Terminated Emory Researcher Disputes University’s Allegations About
China Ties, SCIENCEMAG (May 24, 2019, 1: 55 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019
/05/terminated-emory-researcher-disputes-university-s-allegations.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Zhenhua Lu, Emory University in U.S. Fires Scientists Over Undisclosed Funding Ties
to China, S. CHINA MORNING POST (May 24, 2019, 8:00 PM), https://www.scmp.com/news
/china/diplomacy/article/3011732/us-emory-university-fires-scientists-over-undisclosedfunding.
5 Id.
6 Cohen, supra note 1.
7 Cohen, supra note 1. See also Jon Cohen, Terminated Emory Researcher Disputes University’s Allegations About China Ties, ScienceMag (May 24, 2019, 1: 55 PM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/05/terminated-emory-researcher-disputes-university
-s-allegations; Francis S. Collins, Statement on Protecting the Integrity of U.S. Biomedical
Research, 2018 NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH.
8 Ariel Hart, New Findings: Two Emory Researches Didn’t Disclose Chinese Funding,
Ties, ATLANTA J. CONST. (May 24, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/state—regional-govt—
politics/two-emory-researchers-failed-disclose-chinese-funding-and-ties/QQ58XiznS11TLY
1
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statement regarding the termination of Xiao-Jiang’s employment defended its
actions, stating:
[t]hrough an internal investigation prompted by a letter that the
NIH sent to many academic research universities, Emory discovered that two of its faculty members named as key personnel on
NIH grant awards to Emory University had failed to fully disclose
foreign sources of research funding and the extent of their work
for research institutions and universities in China.9
Xiao-Jiang participated in the Thousand Talents Programme, a controversial
program backed by the Chinese government that intends to attract acclaimed experts to work in China.10
Xiao-Jiang says he worries for his lab workers directed to leave the United
States (one of which was pregnant at the time of Xiao-Jiang’s sudden termination), and he also fears for the future of the hundreds of mice that were indispensable to his Huntington disease research.11 The story of Xiao-Jiang, while certainly not the norm, reflects an increasingly common narrative of Chinese
researchers across the United States.12 Xiao-Jiang’s story illustrates the narrative
of academic espionage: the practice of stealing information related to research,
national intelligence, or security under the guise of academic activity.13 College
campuses have increasingly become primary targets for espionage. Researchers
and government leaders are becoming more creative in their pursuits to steal information in the academic environment. As the threat of academic espionage
rises, universities and U.S. lawmakers will continue to propose policies and legislation aimed at protecting the universities’ intellectual property interests and
national security.14 Despite these efforts, foreign operatives will continue to seek
new ways to obtain information and surpass the United States in areas of technology and science.

v5rARfjL/.
9 Id.
10 Lu, supra note 4.
11 Cohen, supra note 1.
12 Ben Wolfgang, ‘Academic Espionage’: China Suspected of Flooding U.S. with Students
to Access Sensitive Programs, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.c
om/news/2019/aug/22/china-academic-espionage-deploys-students-us-acces/.
13 Id.
14 Ted Mitchell, Memorandum by ACE on Foreign and Academic Espionage, AM.
COUNCIL ON EDUC. (May 10, 2019), https://www.nacua.org/docs/default-source/new-casesand-developments/2019/acemembershipmemo_foreignespionagemay2019.pdf.
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B. Academic Espionage: An Overview
Academic espionage poses a growing security threat that pervades research
communities throughout the state of Georgia and the United States as a whole.15
China and other foreign countries exploit university campuses across the United
States by soliciting intelligence and information related to technological advancements under the guise of academic research.16 The practice impacts U.S.
relations with China as the U.S. government continues to navigate through a
trade war created in large part by U.S. actions and spending behaviors.17 Chinese
efforts to accelerate in the fields of manufacturing, science, and research have
thwarted the U.S. desire to remain the dominant global power in the realm of
technology and trade.18 Further, Chinese and U.S. desires to dominate emerging
technologies in the international arena increase the complexity of this issue.
The United States passed legislation related to academic espionage, and newer
proposals were discussed by members of Congress as recently as 2019.19 While
passing legislation has the power to combat the threat of academic espionage,
current and proposed laws fail to attack the problem in a comprehensive manner.20 International law on espionage is complex, and scholars remain divided on
how best to regulate spying, if regulations on spying should exist at all.21
This Note will first provide a background of the issue of academic espionage
and describe efforts—current and proposed—by U.S. lawmakers. The background section will provide an overview of the threat of academic espionage
while noting specific instances and schemes used by individuals involved in the
practice. The background section will also provide a brief foundation of the current state of the relationship between the United States and China, the current
15 Elizabeth Redden, Scientist Fired From Emory Disputes Charges, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(May 28, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2019/05/28/scientist-fired-em
ory-disputes-charges.
16 See Karin Fischer, Defense Bill Focuses on Academic Espionage, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC. (July 17, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Defense-Bill-Focuses-on/246713
(discussing a bill and provision that works towards this goal).
17 Weijian Shan, The Unwinnable Trade War, FOREIGN AFF. (Nov./Dec. 2019), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-08/unwinnable-trade-war.
18 Elsa B. Kania, Made in China 2025, Explained, DIPLOMAT (Feb. 1, 2019), https://thedipl
omat.com/2019/02/made-in-china-2025-explained/.
19 Elizabeth Redden, Bills Target Academic Espionage, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 19,
2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/06/19/two-new-bills-take-different-app
roach-protecting-us-research-foreign-threats.
20 Andrew Hamilton, The State Department Wants to Limit Chinese Student Visas. Its
Plan Goes Too Far, WASH. POST (June 22, 2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/opinions/the-state-department-wants-to-limit-chinese-student-visas-its-plan-goes-too-far/20
18/06/22/c66f4238-74aa-11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html.
21 See A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law, 28
MICH. J. INT’L L. 595 (2007) (discussing the legality of espionage and difficulties with gaining
a consensus on categorizing or regulating the practice).
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trade war between the two countries, and how current discussions and negotiations may impact the desires of both countries to advance in technology and science.
Next, the Note will highlight the flaws within U.S. legislation related to academic espionage. Here, the Note will explain why international law and regulations must be implemented by the U.S. government to effectively combat the
threat of espionage to U.S. institutions. This analysis will include viewing the
issue of academic espionage through the lens of international trade law. Finally,
this Note will conclude by advocating that states should create and enforce international trade laws to effectively solve the issues raised by academic espionage.

II.

BACKGROUND

Foreign operatives, located primarily in China, have increased efforts to steal
information related to technology, research, and national security through academic exchanges.22 This practice, otherwise known as “academic espionage,”
continues to threaten U.S. academia.23 The threat of academic espionage looms
larger each day, and U.S. researchers and lawmakers have yet to determine an
appropriate response to this unique threat.24
A. Techniques Used: Confucius Institutes and the Thousand Talents Plan
Foreign operatives have found new techniques to steal information through
academic activities—like the Confucius Institutes or the Thousand Talents
Plan—even though specific information sought through these activities remains
relatively unclear.25 In an attempt to establish global dominance in technology
and research, Beijing uses United States universities as virtual breeding grounds
for spying and espionage.26 According to the U.S. Defense Department, “nearly

Wolfgang, supra note 12.
Id.
24 Patricia Zengerle & Matt Spetalnick, Fearing Espionage, U.S. Weighs Tighter Rules on
Chinese Students, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2018, 7:07 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-china-students-exclusive/exclusive-fearing-espionage-us-weighs-tighter-rules-on-chines
e-students-idUSKCN1NY1HE.
25 Zachary Cohen & Alex Marquardt, U.S. Intelligence Warns China is Using Student
Spies to Steal Secrets, CNN POL. (Feb. 1, 2019, 9:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/
politics/us-intelligence-chinese-student-espionage/index.html.
26 Ana Swanson & Keith Bradsher, White House Considers Restricting Chinese Researchers Over Espionage Fears, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04
/30/us/politics/trump-china-researchers-espionage.html?module=inline.
22
23
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a quarter of all foreign efforts to obtain sensitive or classified information in 2014
were routed through academic institutions.”27
The installation of Confucius Institutes on university campuses nationwide
exemplifies how foreign researchers presumably steal information from U.S. researchers.28 Confucius Institutes function as schools funded by the Chinese government and are placed on college campuses in the United States.29 Most Confucius Institutes teach classes in Mandarin, provide cultural education, and seek
community involvement, though the purpose of the school varies from campus
to campus.30 The first Confucius Institute was implemented on a college campus
in 2004, and at its peak, more than ninety Confucius Institutes existed in the
United States.31
Although campuses are allowing more Confucius Institutes to set up throughout the United States, foreign intelligence experts warn of the dangers and risks
associated with the programs.32 The concerns over Confucius Institutes intertwine with larger considerations regarding Chinese efforts to surpass U.S. strides
in technology and security.33 Christopher Wray, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), addressed intelligence concerns related to Chinese information-gathering efforts in a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing in February
2018.34 Addressing the academic response to foreign espionage threats, Wray
exclaimed, “[a]nd I think the level of naïveté on the part of the academic sector
about this creates its own issues. [Chinese researchers are] exploiting the very
open research and development environment that we have, which we all revere,
but they’re taking advantage of it.”35
Other public figures, like politicians, warn of the dangers of academic espionage. Marco Rubio, a Republican Senator from Florida, especially fears threats
posed by Confucius Institutes and Chinese espionage in general.36 During the
Id.
Ted Mitchell, Letter on Confucius Institutes, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. (July 27, 2018),
https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Letter-on-Confucius-Institutes.pdf.
29 Elizabeth Redden, Closing Confucius Institutes, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 9, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/09/colleges-move-close-chinese-government
-funded-confucius-institutes-amid-increasing.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Amy Gunia, A Senate Report Has Slammed the Chinese Learning Centers Operating
at Over 100 U.S. Universities, TIME (Feb. 28, 2019, 1:53 AM), https://time.com/5540703/senat
e-report-confucius-institute-us-universities-chinese/.
33 Mitchell, supra note 14, at 1.
34 Global Threats and National Security: Hearing Before the S. Intelligence Comm., 115th
Cong. (2018) (statement of Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation).
35 Id.
36 Elizabeth Redden, The Chinese Student Threat?, INSIDER HIGHER ED (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/02/15/fbi-director-testifies-chinese-students-and
-intelligence-threats.
27
28
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same hearing in which Wray spoke, Rubio commented that he believes Confucius Institutes are “complicit in these efforts to covertly influence public opinion
and to teach half-truths designed to present Chinese history, government or official policy in the most favorable light.”37 Senator Rubio joined with Senator
Cruz, another senator who is vocal about combatting the threats posed by academic espionage, to explore legislation that uses a hardline approach against various research activities conducted in China.38 According to a statement made by
Senator Cruz, “[t]he Confucius Institutes are the velvet glove around the iron fist
of their campaigns on our campuses. The American government needs new tools
to protect the integrity of our universities and research, and to block academic
espionage.”39 The legislation passed by Cruz followed the public warnings related to academic espionage given by FBI director Christopher Wray.40
Confucius Institutes, while one example of academic espionage, exist among
other mediums through which Chinese operatives and researchers seek to steal
U.S. information through academic engagement.41 U.S. lawmakers fear China’s
“Thousand Talents Plan,” one of the Chinese Communist Party’s many recruitment programs aimed at obtaining U.S. “scientific and technological expertise,”
will subject the United States to security threats and intellectual property theft.42
Although the Thousand Talents Plan is the most known recruitment program
conducted by the Chinese Communist Party, it is one of over two hundred recruitment programs intended “[t]o gain technology from abroad through illegal
or non-transparent means.”43 The Thousand Talents Plan gives applicants options for participating, such as a “short-term” option which allows participants
“[t]o spend only two months in China each year.”44 The recruitment programs
conducted by the Chinese government has reportedly recruited “60,000 overseas
scientists and entrepreneurs between 2008 and 2016.”45 The United States intelligence community warns that the efforts of the Thousand Talents Plan emanate
Id.
Josh Rogin, Preventing Chinese Espionage at America’s Universities, WASH. POST
(May 22, 2018, 2:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/05/22/
preventing-chinese-espionage-at-americas-universities/.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Aruna Viswanatha & Kate O’Keeffe, Chinese Official Charged in Alleged Visa Scheme
to Recruit U.S. Science Talent, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24, 2019, 9:47 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/chinese-official-charged-in-alleged-visa-scheme-to-recruit-u-s-science-talent11569332862.
42 Kate O’Keeffe & Aruna Viswanatha, How China Targets Scientists via Global Network
of Recruiting Stations, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/h
ow-china-targets-scientists-via-global-network-of-recruiting-stations-11597915803.
43 Alex Joske, Hunting the Phoenix, AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE (Aug. 20,
2020), https://www.aspi.org.au/report/hunting-phoenix.
44 Id.
45 Id.
37
38
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from a desire to steal intellectual property and information related to U.S. advancements in technology and research.46
The U.S. government has investigated several researchers as a result of connections with the Thousand Talents Program.47 Yiheng Percival Zhang, a professor at Virginia Tech, was found guilty of conspiracy to commit fraud after filing
to receive grants for research he already completed in China.48 Zhang’s behavior
was suspected of being connected to China’s Thousand Talents Plan.49 In addressing China’s Thousand Talents Plan, FBI Director Wray stated:
[t]he irony is that the U.S. is essentially funding that economic
resurgence through various money it provides through grants,
etc. . . . . I think we need to be a little bit careful that we don’t
find ourselves in a situation where U.S. taxpayer money is being
misappropriated for the advancement of China’s economic dominance over us.50
Confucius Institutes, China’s Thousand Talents Plan, and other espionage efforts—formalized and informalized alike—cause American lawmakers to target
individual researchers and, in particular, researchers from China.51 As a result of
mounting fears related to academic espionage, the U.S. State Department proposed limiting visas for Chinese students.52 Within the past year and a half, the
U.S. government has revoked visas from at least thirty Chinese professors conducting research in the United States.53 One example occurred in Atlanta, Georgia, where the FBI interviewed a social sciences researcher who attended an
event at the Carter Center. The U.S. government subsequently cancelled his
visa.54 Much of the U.S. government’s approach links to FBI Director Wray’s

46 Jeff Mordock, Feds Step Up Probe on China’s “Thousand Talents Plan” After Convictions, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/aug/25/
china-thousand-talents-plan-funnels-us-intellectua/.
47 Id.
48 Virginia Tech Professor Yiheng Percival Zhang Convicted of Swindling U.S. Grants for
Research He’d Already Done in China, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 27, 2019, 1:29 AM), https://
www.scmp.com/news/world/united-states-canada/article/2187817/virginia-tech-professor-yi
heng-percival-zhang.
49 Mordock, supra note 46.
50 Id.
51 Hamilton, supra note 20.
52 Id.
53 Jane Perlez, F.B.I. Bars Some China Scholars From Visiting U.S. Over Spying Fears,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/world/asia/china-academi
cs-fbi-visa-bans.html.
54 Id. (The case of Wu Baiyi, mentioned here, is evidence of the suspicion that the United
States government is particularly focused on interrogating the actions of researchers involved
with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. One researcher involved with the Chinese
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reasoning that academic espionage threatens the “whole of society” and therefore
warrants a “whole of society response.”55 The “whole of society response” mentality fuels American lawmakers to assess this threat from a variety of angles,
including higher education, international relations, and technological competition.56
Although academic espionage gives rise to valid fears, battling these complex
fears leads to unfair prosecutions and firings of scholars. Several stories of students are rich with allegations but fail to assert concrete evidence.57 In deciding
how to best address academic espionage in specific cases, colleges and government officials should first ask if academic espionage is occurring at all. Senseless
firings and investigations have increased stigmas against Chinese professors and
hindered the process toward developing meaningful solutions.58
B. United States Relations with China
To fully understand the efforts made by China to gather intel into U.S. advancements in science and technology and, on the other hand, to understand U.S.
legislation proposed to combat the threat of academic espionage, one must analyze the current state of the relationship between China and the United States.
Since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter recognized China as a nation-state for
the first time, the United States has had a storied trade relationship with the country.59 In 2000, President Bill Clinton signed the U.S.-China Relations Act of
2000, which led to China becoming the United States’ second-biggest trade partner by 2006.60 In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the
United States would “pivot” to Asia to increase investment in the Asia-Pacific

Academy of Social Sciences, in addressing United States action directed towards individuals
at the academy, believed “[t]hey may feel we know too much about the United States.”).
55 Hearings, supra note 34 (statement of FBI Director Wray).
56 Perlez, supra note 53.
57 See Ben Wolfgang, ‘Academic Espionage’: China Suspected of Flooding U.S. with Students to Access Sensitive Programs, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonti
mes.com/news/2019/aug/22/china-academic-espionage-deploys-students-us-acces/.
58 See Matt Apuzzo, Former Espionage Suspect Sues, Accusing F.B.I. of Falsifying Evidence, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/fbi-xixiaoxing.html (discussing the case of a professor who was wrongly accused of academic espionage); see also Emily Feng, FBI Urges Universities to Monitor Some Chinese Students and
Scholars in the U.S., NPR (June 28, 2019, 10:36 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/28/72865
9124/fbi-urges-universities-to-monitor-some-chinese-students-and-scholars-in-the-u-s (explaining that universities are wary of the U.S. government’s approach “because of skepticism
of the threat level and because the FBI requests lack specificity in implementation”).
59 U.S. Relations with China, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/timeline/usrelations-china (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
60 Id.
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region.61 In 2011 and 2012, trade-based tensions between the United States and
China rose as the United States trade deficit grew to a record-breaking $295.5
billion.62
During his administration, President Obama stated that “[t]he relationship between the United States and China is the most important bilateral relationship of
the 21st century.”63 Obama made evident his efforts to establish trade policy
aimed at protecting the United States while engaging the country in globalized
trade by forging the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).64 At the time, the TPP
stood as the world’s most significant trade deal, including commitments and activities comprising forty percent of the world’s economy.65 In keeping with his
administration’s “pivot” towards Asia, the TPP was Obama’s solution to growing trade tensions between the United States and China and his administration’s
international strategy to advance economically while incorporating the participation of other countries.66 The TPP was considered a “hallmark achievement”
for President Obama.67 However, despite Obama’s enthusiasm in creating and
implementing the TPP, the plan quickly divided policymakers.68 When many
members of Congress in President Obama’s own party viewed the TPP with
skepticism, President Obama continued to advocate for the vital partnership he
positioned as foundational to his foreign policy agenda.69 In May 2015, President
Obama traveled to Nike World Headquarters to give a speech on the importance
of TPP membership.70 “If we don’t write the rules for trade around the world,
61 Kenneth Lieberthal, The American Pivot to Asia, BROOKINGS (Dec. 21, 2011),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-american-pivot-to-asia/.
62 COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., supra note 59.
63 Cheng Li, Assessing U.S.-China Relations Under the Obama Administration,
BROOKINGS (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/assessing-u-s-china-relatio
ns-under-the-obama-administration/. See also David E. Sanger & Edward Wong, As Obama
Plays China Card on Trade, Chinese Pursue Their Own Deals, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/us/politics/as-obama-plays-china-card-on-trade-chines
e-pursue-their-own-deals.html (stating that the U.S. and China’s competitive relationship is
seen by “many in the Obama administration . . . as the most important geopolitical power
struggle in the world today.”).
64 Kevin Granville, What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacif
ic-partnership.html.
65 James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacifi
c-partnership-tpp.
66 Granville, supra note 64.
67 Id.
68 See id. (discussing opposition to the TPP by many Democratic organizations, including
unions, environmental, and consumer groups).
69 Siri Srinivas, Trans Pacific Partnership: Obama Ready to Defy Democrats to Push Secretive Trade Deal, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2015, 11:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/business/2015/jan/20/barack-obama-trans-pacific-partnership-republicans.
70 Sanger & Wong, supra note 63.
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guess what?” President Obama asked the crowd during his speech aimed at garnering support for American manufacturers, “China will.”71 The United States
joined the TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership in February 2016.72
Until the election of Donald Trump, the TPP continued to create divisions
along party lines.73 During the first week of Donald Trump’s presidency, he withdrew the United States from the TPP.74 Despite President Trump’s hinting at
rejoining the TPP, the partnership has proven to be one of many complexities
defining the trade relationship between the United States and China.75
Under the Trump administration, the United States became entrenched in a
trade war with China.76 In July 2018, President Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese goods worth $34 billion.77 Threats and actions taken by President Trump
against China are not only rooted in what he claims to be unfair trade policy, but
the tariffs are also a result of what the United States government views as Chinese threats to steal national intellectual property.78
In addition to imposing aggressive tariffs against China, the Trump administration first considered proposals to prohibit Chinese researchers from engaging in academic activity on U.S. university campuses.79 Efforts to combat the
threat of academic espionage undoubtedly relate to safety and protecting the research conducted by U.S. faculty. However, the United States’ insatiable desire
to maintain power and dominance stands as the driving force behind efforts to

Id.
Rebecca Howard, Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed, but Years of Negotiations Still to Come, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tppidUSKCN0VD08S.
73 Id.
74 Adam Taylor, A Timeline of Trump’s Complicated Relationship with the TPP, WASH.
POST (April 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/13/atimeline-of-trumps-complicated-relationship-with-the-tpp/; see also Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/preside
ntial-actions/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific-par
tnership-negotiations-agreement/ (explaining why President Trump chose to withdraw from
the TPP).
75 Ana Swanson, Trump Proposes Rejoining Trans-Pacific Partnership, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/us/politics/trump-trans-pacific-partnership
.html.
76 Dorcas Wong & Alexander Koty, The U.S.-China Trade War: A Timeline, CHINA
BRIEFING (Oct. 12, 2019), https://www.china-briefing.com/news/the-us-china-trade-war-a-tim
eline/.
77 Ana Swanson, Trump’s Trade War with China is Officially Underway, N.Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tarif
fs.html.
78 Id.
79 Swanson & Bradsher, supra note 26.
71
72
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block and prohibit Chinese efforts to spy and steal U.S. intellectual property.80
In addition to the current practice of revoking visas for Chinese researchers, the
White House initially considered implementing restrictions on certain projects
performed by Chinese researchers.81 Proposed projects to be restricted included
activities related to China’s potential scheme to dominate in the technological
arenas of “advanced microchips, artificial intelligence[,] and electric cars.”82
C. United States Law: Past and Present Measures Taken to Combat
Academic Espionage
The United States has grappled with how to best address the threat of academic
espionage by passing various laws aimed at combatting the unique threat. Proposed legislation that would focus on academic espionage comes in various
forms. Many communities, particularly those in the higher education profession,
conclude that current proposals aimed at curbing academic espionage unfairly
prejudice and hinder the open and collaborative academic environments that the
United States prides itself in creating.83 Others claim that the aggressive, unified
actions taken by U.S. lawmakers are beneficial and necessary to protecting national security.84 The challenge of finding appropriate measures to address the
threat of academic espionage will increase as the threat continues to grow and
garner attention within the United States. The challenge of finding a solution by
using United States law alone will perhaps be insurmountable.
The discussions on academic espionage occurring in the halls of congressional
office buildings depend on how members of Congress define the threat in the
first place. Many government officials believe Chinese researchers “are
80 See Lawrence Lau, Behind the U.S.-China Trade War Lies a Competition for Dominance and a Rising Ride of Protectionism, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 17, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2160041/behind-uschina-trade-war-lies-competition (explaining the trade war and competition between the
United States and China).
81 See Ana Swanson, Trump’s Trade War with China is Officially Underway, N.Y. TIMES
(July 5, 2018) (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tari
ffs.html) (explaining the U.S. plan to revoke visas); see also Lawrence Lau, Behind the U.S.China Trade War Lies a Competition for Dominance and a Rising Ride of Protectionism, S.
CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-o
pinion/united-states/article/2160041/behind-us-china-trade-war-lies-competition (explaining
U.S. attempts to limit Chinese involvement related to innovation and technology).
82 Id.
83 Erin N. Grubbs, Academic Espionage: Striking the Balance Between Open and Collaborative Universities and Protecting National Security, 20 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ON. 235, 259
(2019).
84 Owen Churchill, FBI Counter-intelligence Official Warns U.S. to Unite Against Chinese Espionage Threats, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 13, 2018, 6:28 AM), https://www.scm
p.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2177727/fbi-counter-intelligence-official-warns-us-resp
onse-chinese.
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responsible for a great deal of intellectual-property theft.”85 Members of the
Trump administration fear new initiatives made by Chinese corporations to finance research conducted at universities in the United States, an activity the Department of Justice labeled a “roadmap to [intellectual-property] theft.”86 However, beyond stating broad concerns related to protecting intellectual property,
government officials have rarely described their concerns with specificity. One
university administrator, after receiving warnings from FBI Director Christopher
Wray concerning academic espionage, complained:
What exactly Mr. Wray has in mind, where precisely he sees the
threat—this is all left frustratingly vague. Some of the guidance
has been, “[b]e careful about anything to do with biotech.” Well
biotech is huge; I don’t even know which faculty to talk to if you
don’t tell me more.87
As lawmakers continue to try to pass legislation aimed at curbing academic
espionage, members of Congress must answer their opponents who demand an
explanation for what they perceive to be nebulous fears.
Within the past year, Congress implemented two measures in hopes of effectively targeting academic espionage.88 Proposed on June 18, 2019, the Protect
Our Universities Act, if passed, would require Chinese, Iranian, and Russian students to participate in background checks before engaging in certain research
projects.89 The Protect Our Universities Act is sponsored by Senator Josh Hawley, who claims:
For too long, these countries have sent students to our universities
to collect sensitive research that they can later use to develop capabilities that threaten our national security . . . [t]his bill takes
much-needed steps to ensure our research stays out of the hands
of foreign adversaries who are proactively rooting for our failure.90
The U.S. government introduced the Protect Our Universities Act just one
month after Emory University fired Dr. Li Xiao-Jiang without notice after allegedly failing to disclose relationships and funding with China. 91 Many individuals
Nathalie Lees, The New Red Scare on American Campuses, ECONOMIST (Jan. 2, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/01/02/the-new-red-scare-on-american-campuses.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Redden, supra note 19.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Cohen, supra note 1.
85
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within the academic community oppose the bill and believe the approach could
lead to profiling and stereotyping.92
One alternative approach to the Protect Our Universities Act is the Securing
American Science and Technology Act (SASTA).93 The SASTA, if enacted,
would mandate the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and the
United States National Security Advisor to “establish an interagency working
group to coordinate activities to protect federally funded research and development from foreign interference, cyberattacks, theft, or espionage.”94 The SASTA
takes a softer approach in combating the threat of academic espionage, as it
strives to maintain the open and collegial environment of the American academic
community.95 Representative Mikie Sherril, a New Jersey Democrat and sponsor
of the bill, stated, “We have to get this right. We must protect our innovation and
research while maintaining the international engagement and demonstrated value
foreign students bring to our institutions of higher learning.”96 The contrasting
approaches taken by the Protect Our University Act and the SASTA demonstrate
the disagreements within both higher education and national security communities. Neither approach will combat the threat of espionage in its entirety, and as
Congress continues to brainstorm ways to protect academic communities from
foreign spies, the threat continues to mount.97
Many academics and U.S. citizens alike favor the softer approach in combatting the deleterious effects of academic espionage.98 According to the BBC, over
360,000 Chinese students received an education in the United States during the
2017–2018 academic year.99 However, many scholars believe applications from
international students are decreasing because of the recruitment programs’ discriminatory effects, similar to laws passed with the goal of combatting academic

See Redden, supra note 19 (highlighting concerns about profiling on the basis of race
caused by the “increased scrutiny” of Chinese students).
93 Securing American Science and Technology Act of 2019, H.R. 3038, 116th Cong. § 1
(2019).
94 Id. at § 2(a).
95 Redden, supra note 19.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See Statement in Response to Report the FBI is Urging Universities to Monitor Chinese
Students and Scholars, PEN AM. (Aug. 12, 2019), https://pen.org/fbi-universities-monitoringchinese-students/ (explaining how many academics are urging their colleagues “to maintain
their commitment to academic freedom, to uphold the principle of due process, and to respect
the privacy rights of students and faculty, no matter their national origins,” rejecting an approach that results in racial profiling).
99 Trade War: How Reliant are U.S. Colleges on Chinese Students?, BBC NEWS (June 12,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48542913. See also Lees, supra note 85 (stating
that “[f]ully a third [of all students at universities in the United States] are Chinese—a much
larger fraction than from anywhere else, and more students than China sends to all the other
countries in the world put together”).
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espionage.100 American Council on Education Senior Vice President Terry
Hartle expressed concern over declining international college applications as a
result of state action against espionage.101 “Campus officials are worried that international students could become pawns in a trade war,” Hartle commented.102
Former Citizenship and Immigration Services Director Leon Rodriguez testified
in front of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and gave a direct response to the
warnings given by FBI Director Christopher Wray.103 Rodriguez gave a warning
of his own: “The warnings given by Director Wray about possible use of the
Confucius Institutes as vehicles for non-traditional intelligence gathering and
other activities which may undermine open academic discourse deserve to be
taken very seriously and appropriate government action taken in response.”104
Fears over academic espionage are fueling congressional conversations related to allocations and funding. In July of 2019, the House of Representatives
passed a $733 billion defense bill containing language aimed at combatting the
effects of academic espionage.105 Along with the SASTA, the defense bill includes a provision that increases funding for the National Security Education
Program’s Chinese language classes, as well as programming to train participants to recognize and report individuals suspected of spying.106 The defense bill
passed in the House of Representatives and awaits passage in the Senate.107 The
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) is significant legislation that Congress passes each year, and partisan tensions increased complications and adjustments to the bill before it reached President Trump’s desk.108

100 Nick Anderson & Susan Svrluga, Universities Worry About Potential Loss of Chinese
Students, WASH. POST (June 3, 2019, 7:39 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/educa
tion/universities-worry-about-potential-loss-of-chinese-students/2019/06/03/567044ea-861b11e9-98c1-e945ae5db8fb_story.html.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Student Visa Integrity: Protecting Educational Opportunity and National Security Before the Subcomm. on Border Sec. and Immigration of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th
Cong. (2018) (statement of Leon Rodriguez, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP).
104 Id.
105 House Defense Bill Includes Provisions on Academic Espionage, For-Profit Oversight,
AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC. (July 15, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/News-Room/Pages/HouseDefense-Bill-Includes-Provisions-on-Academic-Espionage-For-Profit-Oversight.aspx.
106 Id.
107 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, H.R. 2500, 116th Cong.
(2019).
108 Mike Stone, U.S. House Passes $733 Billion Defense Policy Bill After Trump Threatens
Veto, REUTERS (July 12, 2019, 1:41 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-house-defen
se/us-house-passes-733-billion-defense-policy-bill-after-trump-threatens-veto-idUSKCN1U7
2BA.
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ANALYSIS

A. Categorizing Academic Espionage Within International Law
Academic espionage is regulated at the margins of international law. International regulation of academic espionage is difficult to conceptualize and enforce,
and academic espionage is itself difficult to categorize.109 Interstate relationships
and agreements create the legality of academic espionage, and shifting administrations alter levels of discussion on the topic.110 Academic espionage is best
compartmentalized under international trade law because the services and benefits created by educational institutions affect the economic, transnational relationships between the United States, China, and other countries.111 Aspects of
international immigration law apply to academic espionage as well. Questions
related to visas, global exchanges, and human relations all supplement the discussion regarding solving international academic espionage.112
United States law faces the arduous task of sorting out the disparities in international law on the regulation of academic espionage. The legislative actions
taken by the United States are in many ways harmful and inadequate in regulating academic espionage and monitoring its effects.113 To the extent that United
States law lacks comprehensive regulation for academic espionage, creating a
framework to regulate academic espionage through international trade law is a
noble and necessary endeavor.

See Radsan, supra note 21, at 599 (discussing the complexities of categorizing covert
action).
110 See Mike Giglio, China’s Spies Are on the Offensive, ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionage-war/595747
/ (discussing how trade discussions between the United States and China impact policy decisions related to espionage).
111 Brook Larmer, One of America’s Most Vital Exports, Education, Never Goes Abroad,
but It Still Faces Threats, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/m
agazine/one-of-americas-most-vital-exports-education-never-goes-abroad-but-it-still-faces-th
reats.html.
112 Patricia Zengerle & Matt Spetalnick, Fearing Espionage, U.S. Weighs Tighter Rules on
Chinese Students, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-chinastudents-exclusive/exclusive-fearing-espionage-u-s-weighs-tighter-rules-on-chinese-students
-idUSKCN1NY1HE.
113 See Redden, supra note 19 (discussing how two United States bills proposed to combat
academic espionage have variant approaches and policies).
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B. General Espionage in International Law
Academic espionage is a new phenomenon, and campuses across the United
States face puzzling challenges in combatting the emerging threat.114 Espionage,
on the other hand, has existed in nations across the globe for centuries.115 Espionage is often unregulated within the realm of international law.116 The practice
of international espionage “consists of the access, on behalf of a state, to information that is held by another state and considered as confidential or strategic,
in the military, security, or economic field.”117 Today, many international leaders
and theorists struggle to determine how far to go in regulating espionage, while
many others believe that regulation should not exist at all.118
The legality of espionage is viewed differently in contexts of war than in the
contexts of peace in subsets of the international community.119 Espionage during
times of war is often permissible in the view of most countries, and many countries appreciate the opportunity to gain information through spying in times of
war.120 International law does not expressly encourage wartime espionage, however, at the very least, captured spies receive certain protections during times of
war.121 The 1907 Hague Regulations state: “A spy taken in the act shall not be
punished without previous trial.”122 Further, the absence of explicit international
See Erica L. Green, Universities Face Federal Crackdown Over Foreign Financial Influence, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/us/politics/univer
sities-foreign-donations.html (explaining how colleges are grappling with pressures from government entities to further investigate foreign activity as well as difficulties colleges are having
in maintaining transparency in the relationships researchers have with other countries).
115 Sir Francis Walsingham, the sixteenth century secretary under Queen Elizabeth I, is
often credited with creating espionage practices still used today. See generally STEPHEN
BUDIANSKY, HER MAJESTY’S SPYMASTER: ELIZABETH I, SIR FRANCIS WALSINGHAM, AND THE
BIRTH OF MODERN ESPIONAGE (2005) (explaining how Sir Francis Walsingham used agents,
unraveled codes, and used various tools to further international espionage, paving the way for
espionage tactics still used in modern foreign affairs).
116 See generally Christopher D. Baker, Essay, Tolerance of International Espionage: A
Functional Approach, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1091, 1094–95 (2004) (describing the lack of
definition in international law on espionage).
117 François Dubuisson & Agatha Verdebout, Espionage in International Law, OXFORD
BIBLIOGRAPHIES (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/ob
o-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0173.xml#firstMatch.
118 See id.
119 Iñaki Navarrete & Russell Buchan, Out of the Legal Wilderness: Peacetime Espionage,
International Law and the Existence of Customary Exceptions, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 897,
898 (2019).
120 Jared Beim, Enforcing a Prohibition on International Espionage, 18 CHICAGO J. INT’L
L. 647, 651 (2018).
121 Id.
122 Convention for the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 30–31, Oct. 18, 1907, 33
Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 (explaining that “[w]here
114
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regulation on espionage supports the theory adopted by many state actors that
espionage is not illegal.123 This principle laid the foundation of the Permanent
Court of International Justice’s decision in France v. Turkey, or, The Lotus Case,
which held that states have discretion in participating in certain behavior as long
as the state conduct does not violate explicit law or prohibitions.124
Despite international law’s obscurity on the topic, countless nations behave as
though espionage is legal.125 The United States justifies spying as a necessary
practice in furthering safety for its citizens.126 In 2006, Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte reported that the United States had approximately
100,000 spies conducting espionage-related activities around the globe.127 The
U.S. government has become increasingly aware of spy-related activities directed against the nation, but tracking down spies and combatting their efforts is
a difficult task to perform.128 Advancements in communications and technology
have only facilitated the art of espionage.129
In conclusion, international law regarding general espionage is, in large part,
unsettled.130 However, individual interstate agreements and international principles inform the legal analysis of spying.131 While many state actors view international espionage as invasive and contrary to ideals of individual state
in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy . . . such persons shall
nevertheless be treated with humanity, and in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights
of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention”).
123 Darien Pun, Note, Rethinking Espionage in the Modern Era, 18 CHICAGO J. INT’L L.
353, 361 (2017).
124 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, ¶ 45 (Sept. 7).
125 See Darien Pun, Rethinking Espionage in the Modern Era, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 360
(2017) (explaining how “[e]spionage’s permissibility under international law remains largely
unsettled” and that “[t]he lack of explicit historical prohibition of peacetime espionage in international law has created a customary norm for its permissibility”).
126 See Ellen Nakashima, Verizon Providing All Call Records to U.S. Under Court Order,
WASH. POST (June 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/verizo
n-providing-all-call-records-to-us-under-court-order/2013/06/05/98656606-ce47-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html (reporting the statement of an Obama administration official on
how information seized by spying on telephone calls “has been a critical tool in protecting the
nation from terrorist threats to the United States”).
127 Just How Many U.S. Spies? Try 100,000, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2006), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2006/04/21/world/americas/21iht-spy.html.
128 Warren Strobel & John Walcott, Fewer Russian Spies in U.S. But Getting Harder to
Track, REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2018, 1:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-spi
es/fewer-russian-spies-in-u-s-but-getting-harder-to-track-idUSKBN1H40JW.
129 Bill Priestap, The Spy Business Is Booming and We Should Be Worried, N.Y. TIMES
(July 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/20/opinion/sunday/the-spy-business-is-bo
oming-and-we-should-be-worried.html.
130 Pun, supra note 125, at 360.
131 U.S.-China Cyber Deal Takes Norm Against Economic Espionage Global, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-china-cyber-deal-takes-norm-ag
ainst-economic-espionage-global.
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sovereignty, many others believe the practice should exist as an unregulated activity.132
C. Academic Espionage Under International Trade Law
Academic espionage is best regulated under international trade law. The services and exchanges created in the realm of higher education position academic
espionage as a practice that affects trade relations.133 Academic research is vast
and ever-expanding, and the international aspect of research is implicated and
expressed in many areas of international trade.
D. International Trade Law: A Brief Overview
International trade encompasses customs, rules, and agreements formed between countries intending to govern trade interactions.134 Numerous trade agreements govern the international interplay of exports, goods, and information technology. A trade agreement is “[a]n agreement—such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement—between two or more countries concerning the buying and
selling of each country’s goods.”135 A multilateral trade agreement most often
includes more than two regional countries, and is defined as “[a] treaty that regulates international commerce, such as TRIPs, GATT, or GATS.”136 The United
States is a member to several multilateral trade agreements, including the World
Trade Organization137 and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).138

132 Russell Buchan, The International Legal Regulation of State-Sponsored Cyber Espionage, in INTERNATIONAL CYBER NORMS: LEGAL, POLICY & INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES (AnnaMaria Osula and Henry Rõigas eds., NATO CCD COE Publications, Tallinn, 2016).
133 Beverly Barrett, International Trade and Higher Education Services: The TTIP, the
EHEA, and Beyond, in EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH, PANEL: TRADE
AGREEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE SUPRANATIONAL SHAPING OF
KNOWLEDGE POLICIES (2019).
134 International Trade Law, GEO. L., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/your-life-career
/career-exploration-professional-development/for-jd-students/explore-legal-careers/practiceareas/international-trade-law/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
135 Trade Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
136 Multilateral Trade Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). For reference, TRIPs stands for The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, GATT stands for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and GATS stands for
General Agreement on Trade in Services.
137 United States of America and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/engl
ish/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
138 Ann K. Wootser & Jason Binimow, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of North American Free Trade Agreement and Implementing Statutes and Regulations—
Cases and Materials from Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 6 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2005).
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The United States focuses much of its administrative and government involvement with international trade on trade remedy actions and export control work.139
Trade remedy actions regulate and monitor unfair pricing actions, distortions of
a healthy flow of goods internationally, and unfair government subsidies that
may hinder United States business endeavors internationally.140 An example of
a trade remedy action is a regulation aimed at dumping.141 An antidumping law
is “a statute designed to protect domestic companies by preventing the sale of
foreign goods at less than fair value, as defined in the statute (for example, at a
price below that of the domestic market).”142 The United States International
Trade Commission also outlines antidumping laws.143 The International Trade
Commission is “an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial federal agency that
fulfills a range of trade-related mandates.”144 The International Trade Commission, along with other government agencies, demonstrate the significance of
United States law related to controlling fairness and protecting the national market.145
United States export law is expansive. Export laws govern not only the shipment of fungible goods but also the distribution of surreptitious technology and
information.146 The Bureau of Industry and Security, a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, promulgated ten categories of information and goods to
describe types of exports.147 The Commerce Control List (CCL) denotes the following relevant categories as exports subject to particular regulation: electronics,
computers, telecommunications, and information security.148 The CCL acts
139 See Jane M. Smith, Cong. Research Serv., RL33976, U.S. Trade Remedy Laws and
Nonmarket Economies: A Legal Overview (2013) (outlining United States law related to trade
remedies and exports).
140 An Introduction to U.S. Trade Remedies, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.: ENFORCEMENT &
COMPLIANCE, https://enforcement.trade.gov/intro/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
141 Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, Etc, WORLD TRADE ORG. (last
visited Aug. 28, 2020), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm.
142 Antidumping Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
143 Robert Mordhorst, International Trade Administration v. International Trade Commission: The Scope of Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Investigations Issue, 9 GEO. MASON U.
L. REV. 147, 147-48 (1986).
144 About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about
_usitc.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).
145 See Marguerite Trossevin and Reza Karamloom, Judicial Review of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Determinations by the Department of Commerce: Noteworthy Cases in
2009, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 35 (2010) (discussing the evolution of U.S. law on countervailing
duties, antidumping, and decisions made by the Department of Commerce).
146 International Trade Law, supra note 134.
147 Stanley Keller, U.S. Export Laws and Related Trade Sanctions, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 17, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/11
/17/u-s-export-laws-and-related-trade-sanctions/.
148 Commerce Control List (CCL), BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC. (2019), https://www.bis.doc.
gov/index.php/regulations/commerce-control-list-ccl.
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among other regulations, collectively known as the Export Administration Regulations, as an extensive regulatory mechanism enforced by the Bureau of Industry and Security.149
The discussions and relationships expressed through bilateral trade agreements illuminate international trade law.150 The United States maintains free
trade agreements with twenty different countries.151 Their interest in joining free
trade agreements increased under President George W. Bush’s administration,
and executive support for such agreements emerged after the enactment of the
Trade Promotion Authority in 2002.152 President Obama demonstrated his willingness to join the United States in free trade agreements with the creation of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership.153
Policymakers and citizens alike voiced varying views on the effectiveness and
necessity of free trade agreements. In 2014, the Congressional Research Service
categorized these views on free trade agreements into three groups.154 The first
group opposed free trade agreements and viewed them as “stumbling block[s]”
to achieving liberalized global trade.155 The second group supported free trade
agreements and viewed them as “building block[s]” to producing liberalized
multilateral trade.156 The third group disliked international trade agreements generally, stating that free trade agreements undermined the sovereignty of the U.S.
economy and negatively impacted works in import-sensitive sectors.157 President
Trump took a different approach than both President Bush and President Obama
did on free trade agreements.158 Nonetheless, free trade agreements will continue
149

Stanley Keller, U.S. Export Laws and Related Trade Sanctions, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM

ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Nov. 17, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/

11/17/u-s-export-laws-and-related-trade-sanctions/.
150 See Robert McMahon, The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (June 13, 2016), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rise-bilateral-free-tradeagreements (describing the discrepant thoughts among scholars, stating, “[s]ome economists
praise the trend as contributing to trade liberalization and market reforms while others scorn
the practice as skewing trade norms”).
151 Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE: EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
152 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL7-5700, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 1 (2014).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 11.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See Jim Tankersley, Trump Signs Revised Korean Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/us/politics/south-korea-trump-trade-deal.html
(explaining that “[t]he revised United States-Korea Trade Agreement includes steps to open
up the Korean market to increased American exports”). But see Keith Johnson, While Trump
Isolates the U.S., It’s ‘Let’s Make a Deal’ for the Rest of the World (July 3, 2019), https://foreig
npolicy.com/2019/07/03/while-trump-isolates-u-s-its-lets-make-a-deal-for-the-rest-of-the-wo
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to operate as one of the many moving factors within the international trade framework.159
The United States currently addresses international trade by participating as a
member to several international agreements and consulting various forums for
information related to trade regulation.160 Most importantly, however, the United
States is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).161 The WTO serves
as “the principal forum for setting the rules of international trade. In its two and
a half decades, it has helped reduce barriers to trade of both goods and services
and created a dispute resolution system that supporters say reduced the threat of
trade wars.”162 The WTO built upon the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).163 As the foremost administrative body that creates the legislation, policy, and rules for international trade, members of the WTO should prioritize the
regulation of academic espionage by engaging the members of the international
body. United States involvement with the WTO has been tense, and President
Trump’s desire to out-maneuver China in the trade war led to many controversial
conversations.164 In July of 2019, President Trump tweeted, “[t]he WTO is

rld-trade-fta-mercosur-eu/ (rejecting the idea that Trump is furthering free trade agreements
and stating: “Since Trump took office, the United States has managed to secure only some
minor revisions to the existing trade deal with South Korea and update the existing trade pact
with Canada and Mexico, which still must be approved by Congress”).
159 See David A. Gantz, The “Bipartisan Trade Deal,” Trade Promotion Authority and the
Future of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 115, 153 (2008) (explaining that U.S. international economic policy significantly affects broader U.S. world interests,
such as “maintenance of world peace and security, strengthening of democratic institutions
and support of economic development and the rule of law”).
160 See James McBride, The State of U.S. Trade Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (last
updated Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/state-us-trade-policy (discussing
U.S. trade agreements and policy); see also Trade Organizations, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE: EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/trade-organizations (last visited Aug. 27, 2020) (discussing various trade forums the United States participates in).
161 See Keith Johnson, U.S. Effort to Depart WTO Gathers Momentum, FOREIGN POLICY
(May 27, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/27/world-trade-organizationunited-states-departure-china/ (explaining how the United States is a member to the WTO,
although several members of Congress are urging President Trump to withdraw from the organization).
162 James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, What’s Next for the WTO?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/whats-next-wto (last updated Dec. 10, 2019).
163 Id.
164 See CHAD P. BOWN & DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., WHAT
MIGHT A TRUMP WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION MEAN FOR U.S.
TARIFFS? 1 (2018), https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/what-might-trump-withdrawal-world-trade-organization-mean-us-tariffs (explaining the potential effects of a U.S.
withdrawal from the WTO); see also Adam Behsudi, Trump Ramps up Attack Against WTO,
POLITICO (July 26, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/26/trump-worldtrade-organization-1623192 (discussing President Trump’s disdain with the WTO).
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BROKEN when the world’s RICHEST countries claim to be developing countries to avoid WTO rules and get special treatment. NO more!!! Today I directed
the U.S. Trade Representative to take action so that countries stop CHEATING
the system at the expense of the USA!”165 The future of United States involvement in the WTO may continue to be complex, and predicting the future United
States involvement in any type of international trade agreement will be difficult.166
E. Academic Espionage as Trade in Services: GATS, TRIPS, and the New
WTO
The nature of trade has globalized and advanced significantly throughout history. For most of history, the focus of international trade has been on tangible
goods instead of intangible products and services.167 However, in the 1980s, the
international community developed an increased desire to liberalize trade in services.168 This interest in viewing trade with a more expansive mindset led to the
creation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), a centerpiece
of the WTO Uruguay Round in 1995.169 The GATS, along with the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), created a new
framework for international trade.170 Instead of viewing trade through the lens of
goods alone, the new WTO framework categorizes trade into three distinct categories: goods, services, and intellectual property.171
To understand trade in services, one must assess the four modes of supply
created by GATS, a framework created to categorize different types of services.172 The first mode, cross-border, consists of “services supplied from the
territory of one Member into the territory of another.”173 Consumption abroad
includes “services supplied in the territory of one Member to the consumers of
another.”174 Commercial pressure, the third mode of supply created by GATS,
165 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 26, 2019, 11:29 AM), https://twitt
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167 JOOST H.B. PAUWELYN, ANDREW T. GUZMAN & JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 661 (3d ed. 2016).
168 See id. at 661 (explaining how “[i]nterest in liberalizing trade in services (think of, for
example, banking, telecommunication, or insurance services) began to grow in the late
1980s.”); Jack W. Flader, Jr., A Call for a General Agreement on Trade in Services, 3
TRANSNAT’L LAW 661, 664–66 (1990).
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1 PAK. HORIZON 53, 54 (2012).
170 PAUWELYN, GUZMAN & HILLMAN, supra note 167, at 661.
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involves “services supplied through any type of business or professional establishment of one Member in the territory of another.”175 Finally, the fourth mode,
presence of natural persons, regards “services supplied by nationals of one
Member in the territory of another.”176
Academic espionage falls into the fourth mode of presence of natural persons
established by GATS. The presence of natural persons “could involve persons
who are themselves service suppliers, and present on a temporary basis in foreign
markets for the supply of their services, such as foreign consultants or the employees of foreign services suppliers sent abroad to fulfil a service contract.”177
The work product of faculty and researchers involves services of many types.
From research conducted in labs—like the work done by neuroscientist Li XiaoJiang—to developments in technology and advancements made in medicine, the
services produced by researchers within academia are numerous.178
Academic espionage is most accurately categorized as trade in services; therefore, the practice should be governed by GATS law through the WTO. However,
as academic espionage continues to evolve as an emerging threat in U.S. academia, and as members of Congress continue to highlight intellectual property
concerns related to the phenomenon, the practice of academic espionage should
be regulated through law on intellectual property rights. In addition to GATS,
the WTO 1994 Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) was created to address the intellectual property nature of globalized trade.179 The TRIPS Agreement addresses trademarks, copyright issues, patents, and other issues related to intellectual property rights.180 The TRIPS agreement specifically created a framework for dealing with intellectual property and
designated a dispute resolution system within the WTO.181
F. Applying International Trade Law to Academic Espionage
State actors should regulate academic espionage using international trade law.
Institutions of higher learning produce sensitive data, participate in global research projects, engage students from around the world, and operate in conjunction with government officials and intelligence officers.182 The services produced
Id.
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by colleges and universities bring the work product of institutions of higher
learning within the broad definition of trade created by international law.183
A need for clear regulation of academic espionage exists on college campuses
and within Congress. The livelihoods of researchers and the protection of U.S.
universities depend on it. With little guidance given by Congress or the executive
branch, university administrators and researchers have difficulty approaching the
perplexing issue of academic espionage.184 The current state of the law is the
reason behind sudden firings of researchers like Li Xiao-Jiang on campuses like
Emory University in Atlanta.185 Current legislative proposals either stymie university efforts to create diverse campuses, or prove to be underinclusive in combatting the complexities posed by academic espionage.186 International trade law
would provide clarity and useful enforcement mechanisms to bolster efforts to
keep campuses safe.
Academic espionage can only be regulated at the fringes of international trade
law, for no unified doctrine, treaty, or agreement exists to readily monitor the
threat. To effectively regulate academic espionage, Congress must assess the
many angles of the threat and survey relevant international agreements and laws.
First, it is worth noting that college campuses produce many of the products and
activities deemed as exports by the Commerce Control List. The Commerce Control List (CCL) denotes the following relevant categories as constituting an export subject to particular regulation: electronics, computers, telecommunications,
and information security.187 The United States higher education community
stands at the forefront of the production, creation, and design of materials related
to electronics and computers.188 Further, and perhaps most importantly, college
campuses are also encompassed by telecommunications activities and pursuits
entrenched in information security. American institutions function as gateways
to information on national security, and the products and services created by
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185 See Cohen, supra note 1 (discussing the firing of a Chinese researcher, Li Xiao-Jiang,
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United States institutions allow the activities to be pulled under export law.189
Exports are no longer limited to tangible goods, food, and products for mass production.190 Today, abstract activities and even information are viewed as exports.191 Viewing academic espionage through the lens of an export will allow
the United States to narrow the definition of the activity and further regulate the
practice.
In addition to viewing the practice of academic espionage through the lens of
export law, relying on the treaties, international agreements, and partnerships the
United States is already member to will bolster efforts to combat threats posed
by academic espionage. Despite President Trump’s recent disdain towards the
WTO and its rules related to China (or perhaps because of them), the WTO
should prioritize finding effective solutions to issues raised by academic espionage through its membership and unique position to create rules on international
trade.192 The WTO emphasizes the regulation of various goods, continues to
drive significant conversations on agriculture, regulates services, prioritizes issues related to intellectual property, and more. If the WTO approached the issue
of academic espionage, it would not only assist the member countries interested
in sovereignty and security, but it would further the purpose of the organization.193 Since the 1940s, the WTO has negotiated agreements and policies related
to trade barriers.194 The United States and the WTO alike should value free sharing of information, furthering the marketplace of ideas, and promoting free trade
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across international borders. Were the United States to spearhead an international
effort to combat threats posed by academic espionage through the effective medium of the WTO, trade would flourish in academic communities in a manner
unrestricted by spying. The trade and services produced by United States institutions must be regulated and protected, and the free flow of information and
goods will occur more effectively with international monitoring of espionage in
academic settings.
Of course, international regulation of academic espionage will need to draw
strength upon individual, state-to-state relationships. The state of relations between the United States and China is ever-changing, and new developments in
the U.S.-China trade war arise virtually every week.195 As stated earlier, the practice of espionage is least restricted, and almost encouraged, during times of
war.196 Although the current trade war does not include weapons and soldiers,
convincing the United States and China to completely eliminate actions related
to academic espionage will inevitably prove to be an arduous task. However, the
challenge does not mean the two countries should not try. Academic pursuits
encompass the livelihood of researchers and the activities and dreams of students. Universities often serve as the bedrock of the communities in which they
reside, and the discoveries and work produced by colleges impact the lives of
virtually every citizen around the globe. Protecting the freedom and environments of open institutions is a noble effort that should be prioritized over ambitions to out-maneuver other countries in the pursuit of economic dominance.
G. Why United States Law is Underinclusive and Ineffective in Solving Issues
Raised by Academic Espionage
Current United States law is inadequate to solve the issues created by the practice of academic espionage. Bills discussed on the House floor today are either
unduly aggressive, stymying open and collaborative campuses, or lacking in enforcement mechanisms to eradicate the threats posed by academic espionage in
a comprehensive manner.197 Neither a defensive domestic approach that responds to new threats daily nor an offensive approach that offends American
values of free and open learning environments will best address the complex
challenges raised by academic espionage. Further, international regulation can
serve as a beneficial source of information and medium of enforcement on
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matters of international trade and other contexts where transnational interactions
abound.
The Supreme Court of the United States stated,
[i]nternational law is part of American law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice . . . . For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.198
Academic espionage is intrinsically international in nature. To the extent that
United States law will inevitably miss certain risks posed by academic espionage
in efforts to curb threats posed by the practice, international law is capable of
filling in the gaps. Current United States legislation only focuses on internal practices.199 Producing an international framework to address international espionage
is not only beneficial, it is necessary to address the issue with the level of collaboration and specificity it warrants.
Regardless of the specifics or the medium through which an international
agreement is achieved, an agreement of some sort is needed. Implementing
United States law alone will create an exclusively reactionary model of legislation. Current legislation produced by the United States either punishes researchers for certain activities, limits visas for students from other countries seeking to
gain an education and produce research in the United States or pursues a variety
of other measures that seek to punish instead of preemptively protect. Further,
by relying on U.S. data and sentiment alone, the United States places itself in a
position where the country must play catch-up in discovering new methods, both
technological and administrative, to best combat threats posed by academic espionage.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States will face tough policy choices as more professors, researchers, students, and individuals like Li Xiao-Jiang are brought under increased
scrutiny for espionage-related activities they may not even be participating in.200
Academic espionage is a pervasive activity, yet an activity that is hard to define,
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monitor, and combat.201 Regardless of academic espionage’s definition, its international regulation is of utmost importance. As the trade war between China and
the United States continues to persist, both countries are likely to engage in any
practice that could provide a competitive edge in economics or academia.202 The
two countries are in an all-out battle to achieve dominance, and either country
would welcome an opportunity to garner inside information related to national
security.203 Legislatively, members of the United States House of Representatives will continue to face challenges in drafting solutions that are encompassing
enough to thwart real threats posed by academic espionage-related activities,
while also finding a solution that does not limit the free and open environments
that the United States prides itself in creating throughout the nation’s campuses.204
In many ways, the United States alone cannot tackle the complex challenges
posed by academic espionage. Regardless of the approach various pieces of legislation may take, purely domestic law will allow certain outcomes of the complex problem to pervade throughout academia unregulated. By monitoring and
regulating academic espionage through international regulation, the United
States, along with countries around the globe, will know how to address the problem in a balanced, intelligent, and comprehensive manner. In doing so, the best
way to address issues created by academic espionage is to view the issue through
the lens of international trade. Academic institutions are living, breathing communities where faculty and students conduct activities that span every topical
area available for study. Campuses send researchers around the globe to gather
information related to science, technology, communication, and more.205 College
campuses provide services and produce work products for the communities in
which they reside as well as communities around the world. Trade-based activities conducted on college campuses warrant a trade-based regulatory approach.
A variety of international institutions and agreements stand ready to assist in
the international regulation of academic espionage. However, international regulation of academic espionage is difficult due to the fact that the practice is regulated at the fringes of international law. Simply asking which mode of regulation is best may be a tough question to answer. A better question, perhaps, is
whether academic espionage should be regulated through international trade law
at all. After answering that question in the affirmative, it is important to to construct a regulatory framework that is flexible enough to continue to regulate the
complex issue of academic espionage, and strict enough to provide enforceable
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weight behind the laws seeking to thwart the dangerous outcomes the practice
creates.
Regulating academic espionage is no easy task, nor is defining or even detecting the practice. While espionage itself has existed for centuries, espionage on
college campus is a practice that researchers and lawmakers are only beginning
to track.206 Agents of academic espionage seek more than mere academic information. Because U.S. universities encompass large amounts of information related to economics, trade, and national security, they are appealing targets for
anyone seeking to advance in the global trade competition. Public universities
are instruments of state government themselves, and the global community could
benefit from a collective, international approach to this emerging threat. Although regulating threats posed by academic espionage will not be easy, resorting
to international trade law is necessary for any country interested in maintaining
security within higher education.
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